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Securing Natural Justice in
Arbitration Proceedings
Austin I Pullk
Abstract
The legitimacy and integrity of any system that adjudicates the rights and
duties ofpersons would be evaluated by reference to the standards required by
the principles of natural justice. Arbitration is becoming more popular as a
system of dispute resolution because of the exponential increase of cross-border
transactions that are a feature of globalization. Now arbitrations take place
in countries that lack a well-developed arbitration culture. Courts in some of
these countries have yet to develop a coherent body of law that clarifies and
gives effect to the principles of natural justice. Moreover, important values
protected by natural justice principles can be compromised because offactors
peculiar to arbitration. judicial attitudes to arbitration and the fact that
high value arbitrations are being conducted in places like Mongolia that are
not traditional arbitration hubs make it highly desirable that a uniform and
consistent interpretation of the principles of natural justice be developed by
the courts. This would bring welcome clarity to an area of the law that is
important but unclear because ofjudicial policy.
* School of Law, Singapore Management University.
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I. Introduction
The principles of natural justice,' enshrined in the legal culture of all mature
legal systems, may be said to be the grundnorms2 of any system of adjudication
forming part of a legal system based on the rule of law.3 These legal systems
recognize that decisions that affect the rights and duties of persons, whether
by administrative tribunals obliged to act quasi-judicially or by judges, lack
moral force if the principles of natural justice are breached.4 Detailed sets of
rules giving effect to the principles of natural justice were first developed in
the context of judicial review of administrative actions.5 Thereafter, judicial
'Nemo ludex in sua causa' ('no one shall be a judge in his own cause') and 'audi alteram
partem' ('hear the other side'). In Yong Vui Kong vAG [2011] 2 SLR 1189, 1237, Chan CJ
referred to the former rule as 'the rule against bias' and the latter as 'the hearing rule'. For
the sake of convenience, the terminology of the learned Chief Justice will be adopted in
this article.
2 Hans Kelsen, Pure Theory ofLaw (Max Knight tr, University of California Press, 1967).
'In a Constitution founded on the Westminster model and particularly in that part of it
that purports to assure to all individual citizens the continued enjoyment of fundamental
liberties or rights, references to "law" in such contexts as in "in accordance with law",
"equality before the law", "protection of the law" and the like, in their Lordship's view,
refer to a system of law which incorporates those fundamental rules of natural justice
that had formed part and parcel of the common law of England ... ' per Lord Diplock
in OngAh Chuan v PP [1981] AC 648, 671. In Yong Vui Kong vAG [2011]2 SLR 1189,
1243 Chan CJ observed that the rules of natural justice referred to by Lord Diplock and
the administrative law rules of natural justice are not different rules because they are the
same in nature and function, but that they operate at different levels of the legal order.
Arguably, the principles are enshrined in the bills of rights found in most constitutions.
For example, Art 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)
provides that: 'In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ... everyone is
entitled to a fair and public hearing with a reasonable time by an independent and
impartial tribunal established by law ... ': see European Convention on Human Rights
as amended by Protocols Nos 11 and 14; available at: http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/
rdonlyres/D5CC24A7-DC13-4318-B457-5C9014916D7A/O/ENGCONV.pdf.
Arbitrations that are international in character can satisfy the requirements of Art 6(1)
of the ECHR because the primary instrument that affects international arbitration, the
Convention (note 9 below), itself mandates, albeit indirectly in Art V(1), observance
of these principles. Although it is theoretically an option for an enforcing court to
disregard violation of these principles by enforcing an award that violates principles of
natural justice because of the use of the word 'may' in Art V of the Convention, most
commentators agree that this would be an abuse of the discretion granted in Art V of the
Convention.
Most law students from the Commonwealth and Hong Kong would be familiar with the
classic text, the most recent edition of which is by Lord Woolf, Jeffrey Jowell and Andrew
Le Sueur, De Smith's judicialReview (6th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, 2007).
64
SECURING NATURAL JUSTICE IN ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS
clarification of what is required in order to comply with the principles of natural
justice has occurred in various contexts that required flexibility in the application
of such rules.
Because arbitration has become a popular alternative to litigation, the
observance of the principles of natural justice in arbitration proceedings is an
indispensable requirement in order to preserve its legitimacy. First, the scrutiny
by courts to ensure observance of the principles of natural justice by arbitral
tribunals is necessary especially because arbitrations increase in jurisdictions
that are relatively new to the culture of arbitration. Paris, London, New York,
and Singapore continue to be respected and popular arbitration venues, but
high value arbitrations are also conducted in places like Ulaanbaatar in the
Mongolian language and subject to the arbitration law of Mongolia, the
application of which is overseen by the Khan-Uul District Court of Mongolia.6
The latter group of venues does not yet have as developed an arbitration culture
as the former group of countries, and unfamiliar language issues may also give
rise to concerns in a common law court about the level of observance by foreign
arbitral tribunals of the principles of natural justice. Second, persons such as
small businessmen, franchisees and employees are frequently given no choice
about the type of dispute settlement they would choose and in order to get the
deal, have to sign standard form contracts that mandate arbitration in a foreign
land, a foreign governing law, and a foreign lex arbitri. A familiar charge is that
arbitrators tend to issue awards against the 'small fry' in order to be reappointed
as arbitrators in future arbitrations by the 'big fry'.' Third, as a system of
adjudication, arbitration can be regarded as more potent than litigation in courts
because, unlike court judgments, arbitration awards can be set aside or refused
enforcement only on very limited grounds, and also, unlike court judgments
which depend on their enforcement on recognition of foreign judgment statutes,
arbitration awards are portable and can be enforced in the more than 150
countries that are parties to the 1958 New York Convention on the Recognition
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the 'Convention').9 Reaffirming
6 IMCAviation Solutions Pty Ltd vAltain Khuder LLC [2011] VSCA 248 ('Altain Khuder').
7 Aloe Vera ofAmerica Inc vAsianic Food (S) Pre Ltd [2006] SGHC 78.
Ruth V Glick, 'California Arbitration Reform: The Aftermath' (2003) 38 USFL Rev
119, dealing with state legislation enacted after reports of alleged partiality by repeat
player arbitrators hoping to be selected again in California. Although these allegations
concerned domestic arbitration, there is no reason to believe that international
commercial arbitrators are more immune to the temptations faced by their domestic
counterparts.
The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards was
adopted in New York, the United States on 10 June 1958 and entered into force on
7 June 1959. For a list of parties, see: http://www.newyorkconvention.org/new-york-
convention-countries/contracting-states.
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the observance of the principles of natural justice as an indispensable
requirement for the legitimacy of the arbitration award, the Convention, the
UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration ('Model
Law'),'o national arbitration laws," and the rules of arbitration institutions12 all
require arbitrators to meet the standards required by these principles. Awards
may be set aside or enforcement may be denied if a breach of the principles of
natural justice is found.
Despite the widespread acknowledgment that observance of the principles
of natural justice in arbitration proceedings is a fundamental condition that
must be met in judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings, the informal nature
of arbitration proceedings and judicial acknowledgement of the need for such
informality can, in practice, result in a dilution of the principles of natural
justice. The result might be 'natural justice - lite', such that a decision by an
administrative board that would be quashed on the grounds of a breach of
natural justice could be recognized and enforced in similar circumstances when
made by an arbitral tribunal. In Sermalt Holdings SA v Nu-Life Upholstery Repairs
Ltd," Bingham J observed that a court will be unwilling to subject an arbitrator's
decision making process to a strict review even where such review would have
been mandated if the decision had been taken not by an arbitrator but by a
trial judge. As Bingham J explained, this is because the arbitrator is usually an
expert and there is no expectation that he would behave as if he were a high
court judge. The parties expect him to use skill and diligence in finding out the
facts as quickly and cheaply as possible. But, errors of fact may be made despite
the arbitrator's expertise. These errors do not cause a 'serious irregularity"' but
are simply an ordinary incident of the arbitral process based on an arbitrator's
powers to make findings of fact relevant to the issues. Sometimes, even an
extraneous factor such as the qualifications and experience of the arbitrator
alleged to have breached the principles could be considered in a proceeding to
set aside the award. So not only is '(t)he threshold which an applicant (alleging a
'O UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration; available at: http://
www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral-texts/arbitration/1985Model-arbitration.html.
For example, s 24 of the International Arbitration Act of Singapore (Cap 143A), and
s 33 of the UK Arbitration Act 1996 requires that the tribunal 'act fairly and impartially
as between the parties, giving each party a reasonable opportunity of putting his case and
dealing with that of his opponent'.
12 Any arbitrator may be challenged if circumstances exist that give rise to justifiable doubts
as to the arbitrator's impartiality or independence ... ': Rule 11. 1 of the Singapore
International Arbitration Centre.
' [1985] EGLR 14, 15.
14 The standard set forth by the UK Arbitration Act of 1996.
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breach of natural justice) has to surmount is high. It is particularly so ... (because)
of the undoubted calibre and experience of the Arbitrator' (emphasis added)." A
trial judge, or for that matter a law lord of undoubted eminence and integrity as
Lord Hoffman,' 6 however well-respected, against whom allegations of breaches
of natural justice were made would not normally be accorded a level of similar
deference by a reviewing court.
Several factors promote this indulgent approach by the courts. First, as
courts never tire of pointing out, the parties by choosing arbitration trade the
formality and the punctiliousness of a court proceeding in return for something
quick and informal with the inevitable result that some corners would be cut.'
Invocation of Lord Hewart CJ's famous maxim" in the context of arbitration
would seem overwrought precisely because arbitration is a private and informal
proceeding where public confidence in the administration of the law is not the
central concern of the reviewing court. In deciding how far those corners could
be cut without violating the principles of natural justice, courts are influenced
by factors that would be deemed irrelevant if the decision maker were the head
of an administrative tribunal. Second, the courts of the commercial centres
of the world do not want to be seen as hostile to arbitration by engaging in
intrusive scrutiny of arbitration proceedings. Instead, these commercial centres
compete among themselves for the lucrative 'arbitration business' and strive to
make their venues attractive as seats of arbitration. For example, in March 2012,
the Singapore Ministry of Law, in order to boost Singapore's reputation as a
' Front Row Investment Holdings (Singapore) Pe Ltd v Daimler South East Asia Pte Ltd [2010]
SGHC 80 per Andrew Ang J. In Dallah Real Estate and Tourism Holding Company v
Ministry of Religious Afairs Government of Pakistan [2010] UKSC 46, [2010] 2 Lloyd's
Rep 691, [2010] 3 WLR 1472, although the UK Supreme Court was invited to take
into consideration the high calibre of the arbitrators, it declined to give this factor any
weight.
SR v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, Ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No 2) [20001
1 AC 119.
17 The Pamphilos [2002] 2 Lloyd's Rep 681.
SR v Sussex Justices; ex parte McCarthy [1924] 1 KB 256, 259 ('Sussex Justices') Lord
Hewart CJ ringing call that it is 'of fundamental importance that justice should not
only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done' (emphasis added)
can be contrasted with a more down to earth re-statement by Marks J in Gas & Fuel
Corporation of Victoria v Wood Hall Ltd & Leonard Pipeline Contactors Ltd [ 1978] VR
385, 396 who observed that: 'One amplification of the first rule is that justice must not
only be done but appear to be done' quoted by Andrew Ang J in Front Row Investment
Holdings (Singapore) Pre Ltd v Daimler South East Asia Pte Ltd [2010] SGHC 80 at
[30]. 'The highest requirement that justice should manifestly be seen to be done may
require that a judicial decision be overturned because of the manner in which it was
reached, without it being demonstrated that the result produced injustice. But that is
not the system applied to arbitrations by the [UK Arbitration Act]', per Bowsher J in
Groundshire v VHE Construction [2001] 1 BLR 395 at [40].
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global arbitration hub, introduced amendments to the International Arbitration
Act." One would be hard pressed to cite court reforms expressly designed to
make the courts an attractive venue for litigation. Being a global arbitration
hub is an important qualification for any country or city that wants to be a
commercial centre. The term 'global arbitration hub' connotes a thriving, or
at least an independent, arbitration culture that is supported by the courts.
Court interference with arbitrations is discouraged in such cultures and courts
in Model Law jurisdictions are enjoined to refrain from intervening in arbitral
proceedings unless expressly authorized to do so by the Model Law provisions.20
Frequent setting aside of awards based on a breach of the principles of natural
justice could negatively affect the market's perception of the seat of arbitration as
a desirable venue to conduct the arbitration. Third, in practice, the award-debtor
not infrequently tries to set aside or resist enforcement of an award on the
ground that the principles of natural justice were breached. Not surprisingly, this
claim becomes quickly jaded and the courts keep out these frivolous claims by
requiring satisfaction of a detailed criteria to hold that the award should be set
aside because of the breach of these principles. But sometimes the application of
the standard could be too strict and therefore inappropriate because of the high
threshold that the complaining party has to surmount.21 Finally, international
commercial arbitration is popular as a means of settling disputes because the
Convention requires state parties to enforce foreign arbitral awards where the
Convention's conditions for enforcement are satisfied. Courts wanting to achieve
the objectives of minimal court interference and ease of enforcement mandated
by the Convention are concerned that such objectives could be undermined
if awards are set aside or not recognized on grounds that do not disclose an
egregious breach of the natural justice principles. Because of the foregoing
factors, a purist's insistence on adherence to the principles of natural justice in
their strictest form may not be practicable or desirable. The danger, however, is
that a reviewing court can go too far in the other direction and, influenced by
the talismanic invocation of pro-arbitration policy, allows serious breaches of
natural justice principles to go uncorrected.
'9 The International Arbitration (Amendment) Bill, introduced in Parliament on 8 March
2012, Republic of Singapore, Government Gazette (Bills Supplement) No 10. The
principal amendments expand the definition of 'writing' as required in a valid arbitration
agreement and would also allow a court to review for correctness a decision by an arbitral
tribunal that it lacks jurisdiction.
20 Model Law, Art 5. The non-intervention principle enshrined in s 1(c) of the UK
Arbitration Act guides a court in the approach to an interpretation of s 33 of the Act. See
Lesotho Highlands v Impreglio SpA [2005] UKHL 43.
21 Front Row Investment Holdings (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Daimler South EastAsia Pte Ltd [2010]
SGHC 80 per Andrew Ang J.
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II. Fairness and Natural Justice
The common law draws a distinction between situations where there is an
obligation to act fairly and other situations where there is not only the obligation
to act fairly but also, when so acting, observe the principles of natural justice.
Some judges have been impatient with what they perceive as an unhelpful
technical distinction. For instance, Mason J (as he then was) observed: 'What is
appropriate in terms of natural justice depends on the circumstances of the case,
and they will include, inter alia, the nature of the inquiry, the subject matter and
the rules under which the decision-maker is acting ... The critical question in
most cases is not whether the principles of natural justice apply. It is: what does
the duty to act fairly require in the circumstances of the case?'22 With respect,
it is submitted that for practical and legal reasons, it is incorrect to conflate
these two concepts. Observing the distinction leads to commercial efficacy and
respects legislative intent. Statutes, like arbitration statutes, command observance
to principles of natural justice which is obviously a term of art when used by a
parliament enacting legislation in the backdrop of common law. For example,
s 8(7A) of the Australian International Arbitration Act23 explicitly states that it is
against the public policy of Australia to enforce an award where 'a breach of the
rules of natural justice occurred in connection with the making of the award'.
Taken literally, s 8(7A) of the Australian International Arbitration Act can be
read to mean that any breach, regardless of the prejudice suffered by the award-
debtor, is a ground for refusing enforcement of a foreign award. Clearly, simple
unfairness that does not also amount to a breach of natural justice principles
will not be sufficient to trigger the operation of this provision. One will have to
examine specific natural justice principles enunciated by the courts to give effect
to s 8(7A) of the Australian law. It must therefore be concluded that whereas
the duty to act fairly may not require observance of the principles of natural
justice in all cases, the obligation to observe the principles of natural justice
invariably requires that the decision process be fair.24 The danger of conflating
these two concepts is that a court may conclude that an arbitrator acted fairly
and thus deny a set aside claim or permit enforcement against an award debtor
who complains about a breach of these principles when in fact a more detailed
inquiry into the factual matrix to ascertain whether one of the technical sub-
rules of the principles of natural justice should have been undertaken.
22 Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550, 584-85.
23 International Arbitration Act 1974 (Cth).
24 See Furnell v Whangarei High Schools Board [ 1973] AC 660, 679 per Lord Morris
of Borth-y-Gest: 'Natural justice is but fairness writ large and juridically. It has been
described as 'fair play in action.'
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The arbitrator, unlike a consulting engineer in a construction contract or a
valuer, is not an employee.25 The arbitrator, while owing her appointment to the
parties, is also independent of the parties. It is a default term of the arbitrator's
terms of engagement that her functions and duties require her to rise above
the partisan interests of the parties. Unlike a consulting engineer or a valuation
expert, an arbitrator is not in a position of subordination to the parties. She is
in effect a 'quasi-judicial adjudicator'.2 6 The sensitivity to fair play is so acute in
the common law that it even requires observance of natural justice principles
even of those performing functions of a quasi-arbitrator. However, the demands
of business and the practices of some service industries, such as construction,
are such that one person can wear two hats, and when an employee who is a
professional wears the non-employee hat, all that is required of that person is
that he acts independently and honestly." This distinction is best illustrated by
construction law cases.
In Hounslow London Borough Council v Twickenham Garden Developments
Ltd,2 Megarry J held that a certifying architect was only obliged to retain
his independence and that unless the contract provided otherwise, he need
not observe the rules of natural justice. In the first instance decision in the
New Zealand Supreme Court in A C Hatrick (NZ) Ltd v Nelson Carlton
Construction Co Ltd,29 Richmond J stated that an architect or engineer acting
as a certifier must exercise honest and independent judgment, and went on to
reject implications of 'fairness' because the term connoted obedience to natural
justice. However, the New Zealand Court of Appeal in Canterbury Pipe Lines
Ltd v Christchurch Drainage Board0 did not think that the concept of fairness
necessarily connoted a duty to follow the principles of natural justice. According
to Cooke J, 'Duties expressed in terms of fairness are being recognised in other
fields of law also, such as immigration. Fairness is a broad and even elastic
concept, but it is not altogether the worse for that. In relation to persons bound
to act, judicially fairness requires compliance with the rules of natural justice. In
other cases this is not necessarily so.' 31
25 Hashwani vjivraj [2010] EWCA (Civ) 712.
26 K/S Norjar/A/S v Hyundai Heavy Industries Co Ltd [1992] QB 863, 885.
27 See generally, DJ Mullan, 'Fairness: The New Natural Justice?' (1975) 25 University of
Toronto LJ28 1.
28 [1971] Ch 233.
29 [1964] NZLR 72.
30 [1979] 2 NZLR 347, 357.
31 Ibid, 357.
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It is a highly permeable membrane that separates situations where there is a
duty to act with fairness that also requires observance of the principles of natural
justice from other situations where a duty to simply act with fairness is all that
is necessary. Because arbitrations are supposed to be informal and quick, there
is a temptation to regard an arbitrator who has merely acted fairly as one who
thereby observed the principles of natural justice. This temptation is not always
resisted.
The special features of arbitration, such as the experience of the arbitrator,
the informal nature of the proceedings and the need for a speedy resolution
of the disputes, are sometimes invoked to justify recognizing awards despite
the arbitrator violating some of the principles of natural justice. This result is
ironical because this approach serves to lower the bar of procedural fairness in
arbitration and in turn reduces the integrity of the process. As arbitrations are
conducted in many countries that lack the professional culture that places the
emphasis on observing the principles of natural justice found in common law
cultures, arbitrators might not be so vigilant about observing these principles.
If courts entrusted with setting aside or enforcing arbitral awards are less
tolerant of a breach of these principles, consequences that improve the quality
of arbitration and make arbitral awards more acceptable would follow. First,
arbitrators would not want to get a reputation for breaching principles of natural
justice and suffer the ensuing reputational damage. Second, market forces would
operate to discipline errant arbitrators because parties and their advisors would
shun arbitrators whose awards have been set aside on grounds that natural
justice principles were not observed. Third, the effect of strict insistence on
observance would incentivize counsel appearing before arbitral tribunals as well
as the arbitrators themselves to be mindful of the principles. The result would be
that it would be in the interests of all parties involved in the arbitration, though
for different reasons, to support the observance of the principles in arbitration
proceeding.
III. Non-Signatories and the Principles of Natural Justice
When a party to an arbitration agreement declines to appear before an arbitral
tribunal established pursuant to that agreement, the tribunal could proceed
nonetheless and issue an award against that party. No court would entertain a
plea by the award-debtor that the award should not be enforced because the
hearing rule was breached. The situation is different when a third party who
is not named as a party to the arbitration agreement, a non-signatory, is asked
to appear as a defendant in an arbitration. If this third party denies being a
party to the arbitration agreement, then the arbitral tribunal has prima facie
no jurisdiction over him. If the tribunal fails to notify the non-signatory that
he is alleged to be a party and does not invite him to contest that claim, there
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is a clear breach of the hearing rule.3 2 However, if the non-signatory defendant
is summoned but still refuses to appear before this tribunal which then makes
an award against him, the hearing rule is prima facie violated and the value of
the award as being compliant with the principles of natural justice becomes
questionable. The argument that the non-signatory had the opportunity to
appear but willfully declined to do so and thus must bear the consequences of
its choice is unpersuasive. Unlike a signatory who refuses to attend, the non-
signatory could well take up the position that it should not be asked to bear the
expense and inconvenience of litigating in an expensive foreign capital to contest
the jurisdiction of the tribunal. That is perhaps one reason why it has been
held that the non-signatory has no obligation to first try to set aside the award
before the court of the seat of the arbitration before resisting enforcement of the
award in a foreign country.33 If the arbitral institution appoints an arbitrator to
complete the composition of the tribunal because the non-signatory refuses to
participate and the tribunal so constituted issues an award adverse to the non-
signatory, important principles are put into play.
First, however diligently the arbitral tribunal considers the arguments that
could have been made on behalf of the non-signatory that it is not a party to the
arbitration agreement, this is no substitute for hearing the arguments made by
the non-signatory. The command is clear, 'audi alteram partem' which command
is not satisfied when the tribunal considers arguments sua sponte.34 As will be
seen later, an important rule in arbitration proceedings is that counsel for the
parties be allowed to argue points of law before the tribunal, and a tribunal
should not decide legal questions about which there has not been submissions
from counsel. Moreover, lawyers accustomed to the adversarial system would
be sceptical of the value of such an exercise where robust legal arguments for
both parties are missing. Second, the established jurisprudence in much of the
common law world is that the burden of proof is on the non-signatory award
debtor to show that it was not a party to the arbitration agreement in any action
to set aside the award or resist its enforcement.35 The UK Supreme Court in Dallah
32 See Altain Khuder (note 6 above) pp 293-96.
3 The view that the non-signatory should attempt to set aside an award in the court of the
seat of the arbitration that found favour in Aloe Vera ofAmerica Inc v Asianic Food (S) Pte
Ltd [2006] SGHC 78 was rejected by the UK Supreme Court in Dallah (note 15 above).
It cannot be argued that the second principle is being violated when the tribunal rules on
its own jurisdiction as this happens all the time in arbitrations and in court proceedings.
* See Dallah (note 15 above). This conventional reading of Art V of the Convention, as
implemented by arbitration statutes, was decisively rejected by the Victorian Supreme
Court in Altain Khuder (note 6 above).
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made it abundantly clear that, when an enforcing court tries to determine
whether the non-signatory was a party to the arbitration agreement it will not be
bound by the holding of the tribunal that the non-signatory was a party to the
agreement. The court also made it equally clear that a foreign enforcing court
must be satisfied that the foreign law used by the arbitral tribunal to support
the assertion of jurisdiction over the non-signatory must be fair. Referring to
a principle of French law that the tribunal invoked to authorize jurisdiction
over the Government of Pakistan, the non signatory, Lord Mance SCJ observed
that '[i]t is difficult to conceive that any more relaxed test would be consistent
with justice and reasonable commercial expectations, however international the
arbitration or transnational the principles applied'. This is an authoritative
statement by the UK Supreme Court that the satisfaction of justice referred to
by Lord Mance SCJ is an in limine issue. It is only after the enforcing court is
satisfied that the principle of foreign law that authorizes jurisdiction is fair that
it will inquire whether the tribunal erred in applying the law to the facts in order
to conclude that jurisdiction over the non-signatory is established.
In Dallah, the UK Supreme Court found that the arbitral tribunal had
wrongly concluded that the Government of Pakistan was a party. If a foreign
enforcing court finds that under an acceptable theory of jurisdiction, the foreign
arbitral proceeding rightly assumed jurisdiction, may a non-signatory award-
debtor be allowed to show that the facts would not have justified imposition
of liability under the substantive principles of contract law as determined by
the tribunal? In other words, should the foreign court allow the award debtor
to challenge the award on the merits? Such a course of action goes against
the accepted rule that an enforcing court should not engage in a review of
the merits of case. On the other hand, it is unjust to enforce an award against
an award debtor where strong arguments that could have been advanced to
show that on the merits the non-signatory should not be held liable were not
made. It is submitted that the enforcing court in such cases should engage in a
limited review so that manifest errors of law or grave and manifest errors in the
application of the law to the facts should be a ground for non enforcement. This
procedure could be justified as an application of the public policy exception in
Art V(2) of the Convention.
36 See Dallah (note 15 above), [18].
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IV. Natural Justice in the Arbitral Jurisprudence
of Singapore
A. Generalprinciples
A dualist system of arbitration exists in Singapore. The IAA,3 7 which
incorporates the Model Law and the Convention with legislative clarifications
and amendments, applies to international commercial arbitrations as this term
is defined by the Model Law, while the Arbitration Act applies to domestic
arbitrations and permits a greater judicial involvement in the arbitration. Section
24(b) of the IAA and s 4 8(1)(a)(vii) of the Arbitration Act respectively permit
the court to set aside an award where there is a breach of the rules of natural
justice that occurred in connection with the making of the award that resulted
in prejudice to the rights of a party. As Rajah JA observed with regard to these
provisions, 'no State will permit a binding arbitral award to be given or enforced
within its territory without being able to review the award, or, at least without
allowing the parties an opportunity to address the court if there has been a
violation of due process'.3 The language of these provisions makes it clear that
the power to set aside an award is a discretionary power. However, the Singapore
Court of Appeal, while noting that the Singapore courts infrequently use their
power to set aside awards, also declared that 'they will unhesitatingly do so if a
statutorily prescribed ground for setting aside an award is clearly established'.40
The policies behind the rule against bias and the hearing rule are also enshrined
in the Model Law and the Convention in that both instruments refer to
the hearing rule explicitly while the rule against bias is a part of the public
policy exception. Although allegations of bias are on the rise in international
commercial arbitrations, ' bias, whether actual or apparent, has been rarely
alleged with regard to international commercial arbitrations conducted in
Singapore. However, the allegation that the hearing was unfair and that due
process was denied is regularly made and when made has resulted in a detailed
assessment of the allegation by the courts.
3 International Arbitration Act (Cap 143A).
38 Arbitration Act (Cap 10, 2002 Rev Ed).
39 CRWJoint Operations v PT Perusahaan Gas Negara (Persero) TBK [2011] 4 SLR 305
at [26].
40 Ibid, [27] per Rajah J.
Sam Luttrell, Bias Challenges in International Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer Law
International, 2009), p 4, believes that 'bias challenges are now a key means of "playing
dirty" in' international commercial arbitration.
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The relationship of s 24(b) of the IAA to corresponding provisions in the
Model Law raise issues about the scope of coverage of these respective provisions.
The provisions deal with setting aside awards and do not address the issue of
enforcing foreign awards. Section 24 of the IAA states explicitly that the High
Court 'may, in addition to the grounds set out in Article 34(2) of the Model
Law' set aside an award if the tribunal making the award has breached the rules
of natural justice by which 'the rights of any party have been prejudiced'. Article
34(2) of the Model Law, unlike s 24(b) of the IAA or s 48(1) of the Arbitration
Act, does not require that the affected party show that his rights have been
prejudiced. It would appear that s 24(b) of the IAA must be read as replacing
Art 34(2)(ii) of the Model Law pro tanto so that prejudice must always be proved
to set aside an award. For the purposes of setting aside an award, the words 'in
addition to' in s 24 must be read to mean 'notwithstanding'. A plain reading of
s 24(b) of the IAA suggests two conclusions. First, the breaches of natural justice
referred to may not be of the magnitude or severity contemplated by the Model
Law or the Convention where the award could be set aside or not enforced
because of serious breaches of procedure. In other words, while a Singapore court
might not refuse to enforce a foreign award pursuant to s 31(2), which mirrors
Art V(1) of the Convention, because the infraction is insufficiently serious, it
might, in the same factual circumstances, set aside an award that causes detriment
to the complaining party because of its interest in policing the arbitration and
ensuring compliance with her lex arbitri. Thus s 24(b) of the IAA and s 48 of
the Arbitration Act could be read as, at the very least, a direction and caution to
arbitral tribunals conducting arbitrations in Singapore to adhere to certain basic
standards of natural justice. Second, the 'rights of any party' referred to in the
sub-section embraces a range of procedural rights as well as substantive rights.
However, the quality of the infraction must be such that prejudice must result.
Accordingly, even infractions that are more than de minimis infractions will not
engage s 24(b) of the IAA if no prejudice is caused. This is rightly so because
the flexibility and informal nature of an arbitration that the parties themselves
wanted would be compromised if there is any procedural default, however minor
that does not cause detriment, permits a court to set aside an award pursuant to
section 24(b) of the IAA.
In John Holland Pty Ltd v Toyo Engineering Corp (Japan)4 2 the court set forth
the criteria that must be satisfied by a party invoking s 24(b) of the IAA. It
stated that the challenging party must show:
42 [20011 1 SLR (R) 443.
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a. which rule of natural justice was breached;
b. how it was breached;
c. in what way the breach was connected with the making of the award; and
d. how the breach prejudiced its rights.
Subsequently, the Singapore Court of Appeal elaborated on these principles.
Although, the pronouncement was made in respect of the hearing rule, some of
the criteria listed will also apply when the allegation is that the rule against bias
was violated. When stating these criteria, the court was interpreting s 48 of the
Arbitration Act but subsequent cases have held that these criteria also apply to
the interpretation of s 24(b) of the IAA.43
In Soh Beng Tee & Co Pte Ltd v Fairmont Development Pte Ltd" ('Soh Beng
Tee'), the Singapore Court of Appeal interpreted the scope of the obligation as
set forth in s 48 of the Arbitration Act. According to the court, the 'overriding
concern ... is fairness'.45 It then went on to state the following principles on
how the standard of natural justice operates in an arbitration proceeding, which
set of criteria have been used as the starting point in subsequent decisions to
evaluate claims that natural justice principles were breached in the arbitration
proceeding:
a. Parties have a right to be heard effectively on every issue that may be relevant
to the resolution of the dispute. The arbitrator must treat the parties equally
and allow them the opportunity to present their cases and to respond. The
arbitrator should not base his decision on matters not submitted or argued
before him.
b. The court is not a place where the losing party has a second bite at the cherry.
So no arid or technical challenges should be entertained by the court.
c. Given the nature of arbitration, the courts should follow the international
practice of minimal curial intervention. The two principal considerations that
support this practice are: (i) a need to recognize the autonomy of the arbitral
process by encouraging finality so that its advantage as an efficient alternative
43 Kempinski Hote SA v PT Prima International Development [2011] 4 SLR 633 and Sobati
General Trading LLC v PTMultistrada Arahsarana [2009] SGHC 245.
44[2007] 3 SLR (R) 86.
4 The court went on to observe that '[flairness ... is a multidimensional concept' and that
'the ... conception of fairness justifies a policy of minimal curial intervention ... ': ibid,
[651.
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dispute resolution process is not undermined; and (ii) acknowledge that
when the parties chose arbitration, they accepted the very limited right of
recourse to the courts. A court should not intervene because it might have
resolved the various controversies in play differently;
d. That the arbitrator did not refer every point for decision to the parties for
submissions is not invariably a ground for challenge. It is only where the
impugned decision reveals a dramatic departure from the submissions or
involves the arbitrator receiving extraneous evidence, or adopts a view wholly
at odds with the established evidence or adopts a view wholly at odds with
the established evidence adduced by the parties or arrives at a conclusion
unequivocally rejected by the parties as being trivial or irrelevant, might it
be appropriate for a court to intervene. The party challenging the award
must show that a reasonable litigant in his shoes could not have foreseen the
possibility of reasoning of the type revealed in the award.
e. The parties will urge diametrically opposite solutions to resolve a dispute. The
arbitrator is not required to adopt an either/or approach. He may embrace
a middle path so long as it based on the evidence before him and he is not
required to consult the parties on his thinking processes before finalizing his
award unless it involves a dramatic departure from what has been presented
to him.
f. Each case must be decided within its own factual matrix. An award should
be read generously such that only meaningful breaches of the rules of natural
justice that have actually caused prejudice are ultimately remedied.
In applying the criteria set forth in Soh Beng Tee, reliance on English decisions
should be undertaken with care because the standard under the UK Arbitration
Act is 'serious irregularity' which combines different concepts such as the
existence of the breach, the way in which the breach occurred and the prejudice
caused thereby. Section 24(b) of the IAA and s 48 of the Arbitration Act, on the
other hand, unbundle these concepts and enumerate them as distinct criteria.
Accordingly, in determining whether a breach of the principles took place, it
would not be appropriate to consider whether any mitigating factors operated
to cause the breach. Once a breach has occurred, the issue of prejudice, not
qualified as substantial or serious, is a separate issue that the court should
consider.
B. The hearing rule
Article V (1)(b) of the Convention in its pertinent part refers to a situation where
the award-debtor 'was *** otherwise unable to present his case'. As the well-
known authors of the standard treatise on arbitration observe, Article V(1)(b) of
the Convention is 'the most important ground for refusal under the New York
Convention (and the Model Law)' and go further to observe that this provision
is 'directed at ensuring that the arbitration itself is properly conducted, with
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proper notice to the parties and procedural fairness'. Another scholar observes
that: 'Due process ... is often understood as a "hard" rule of law, a kind of core
or foundation of all other procedural rules, the violation or disregard of which
will lead to unenforceability of the award or decision given'. Although the
language of Article V of the Convention, the use of the word 'may', implies a
discretion to enforce an award despite a breach of the rules of natural justice,"
no court would be willing to enforce a foreign award that breaches these
principles unless the effects of the breach are de minimis. The Singapore Court of
Appeal re-affirmed the hearing rule as the first principle in Soh Beng Tee.
The nature of arbitral proceedings and the deference accorded by the courts
to decisions by arbitrators on how to structure proceedings and conduct
hearings provides the context for disputes over whether the arbitrator observed
the hearing rule. Obviously, a party may feel aggrieved that an argument it had
advanced, especially if the argument related to the proper interpretation of a
foreign law that was not familiar to the arbitrator, was given short shrift by the
arbitrator. Arguably, Principle (d) enunciated in Soh Beng Tee would not allow
a party complaining about a superficial or untenable analysis by the arbitrator
relating to a submission on foreign law to succeed. But this is not a bright line
rule.
Although grounded in fairness, the specific applications of the hearing rule
mirror another concept of fairness in the law, the concept of equality of arms.
In the context of the hearing rule, this means that each party must be advised
of, and be able to make submissions with respect to, legal and factual arguments
made by the other. Surprise in the form of a theory of liability propounded by
the arbitrator but not be shared with the parties and not hearing the submissions
of such parties must be avoided at all costs. Many of the complaints about the
breach of the hearing rule relate to the use of material that was not disclosed to a
party or in respect of which a party was not invited to make submissions.
46 Alan Redern and Martin Hunter with Nigel Blackaby and Constantine Partasides, Law
and Practice ofInternational CommercialArbitration (4th ed, Thomson Sweet & Maxwell,
2004) 10-39.
17 Matti S Kurkela and Hannes Snellman, Due Process in International Commercial
Arbitration (Oceana Publications Inc, 2005), p 1.
8 In Dardana Ltd v Yukos Oil Co [2002] 1 All ER (Comm) 819, Mance LJ stated the
widely accepted position in common law countries that the discretion to enforce an
award where an award-debtor satisfies the requirements of Art V is limited to extreme
cases.
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The two clear principles that can be extracted from Singapore decisional law
are as follows: first, the arbitrator must conduct a hearing that can broadly be
characterized as fair; and second, the arbitrator's award must not contain any
surprises especially novel theories of liability or an interpretation of facts that
a party had no opportunity of contesting. The leading Singapore cases dealing
with allegations of breaches of the hearing rule have usually turned on fact
situations where the arbitrator had not shared his preliminary views or thinking
on the facts, and the law as submitted by the counsel for the parties. The
decisions, relying on English precedent, tend to reject assertions of such a broad
duty upon arbitrators to share their thinking with the parties or apprise the
parties of their train of thought during the proceedings. The Singapore Court
of Appeal in Soh Beng Tee as well as subsequent decisions have drawn the line
where the arbitrator comes up with some new theory or an argument so fanciful
that it could not have been anticipated by the parties and thus constitutes an
unfair surprise. There is no obligation for the arbitrator to share her views with
the parties as the arbitration proceeds.
It would appear that the first step taken by the courts when a breach of the
hearing rule is alleged is to examine the conduct of proceedings to ensure that
they were fair. In F Hoffinann-La Roche & Co AG v Secretary of State for Trade &
Industry," the House of Lords held that once a fair hearing has been given, the
decision maker does not have to disclose what he is minded to decide so that
the parties have a final opportunity of criticizing his mental processes before he
reaches a final decision. Because speedy resolutions of disputes in arbitration are
desirable, unnecessary delay is to be avoided. Accordingly in 7he Pamphilos,0
the court emphasized that it was not necessary to refer back to the parties for
further submissions every single inference of fact from the primary facts which
arbitrators intend to draw. Once it is established that the hearing passed the basic
test of fairness, the complaining party is allowed to make specific allegations of
the breach of the hearing rule.
Courts are alert to allegations of unfair surprise caused by the arbitrator. In
Fox v PG Wellfair Ltd,1 the court held that an arbitrator who develops a novel
theory about the interpretation of the facts or of the law must bring this to the
attention of the parties. He should not surprise the parties with his own ideas.
If he reaches a conclusion contrary to or inconsistent with the evidence given at
the hearing, he must bring this to the attention of the parties and give them an
opportunity to deal with it. This element of unfair surprise is a feature that the
" [1975] AC 295, 369.
50 [2002] 2 Lloyd's Rep 681.
5 [1981] 2 Lloyd's Rep 514.
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courts will discourage in arbitral proceedings. Bingham J in Sermalt Holdings SA
v Nu-Life Upholstery Repairs Ltd,52 observed that it is not right that a decision
should be based on specific matters which the parties never had a chance to
deal with because this is contrary both to the substance of justice and to its
appearance.
Sometimes, an experienced arbitrator can spot a legal argument that has not
occurred to counsel in the proceedings. Maybe he based his award on this legal
argument that was not told to counsel and about which counsel did not have an
opportunity to comment? In Trustees ofRotoaira Forest Trust vAttorney-General,"
the court observed that when it came to ideas rather than facts, the plaintiff
must show that a reasonable litigant in his shoes would not have foreseen the
possibility of reasoning of the type revealed in the award. Furthermore, he must
show that with adequate notice it might have been possible to persuade the
arbitrator to a different result. The thrust of the inquiry is well captured in the
test put in ABB AG v HochtiefAirport GmbH,5 ' where the court asked whether
all the essential elements that might lead to the conclusion were in play? There
is no duty to refer back to the parties the arbitrator's analysis of the material and
the additional conclusion which he derived from the resolution of arguments as
to the essential issues which were already squarely before the tribunals. The main
question to ask is whether the parties were able to address arguments on all of
the essential building blocks in the conclusion?
The Singapore courts have relied on the broad outlines of this jurisprudence
that has sought to balance the efficiency of arbitral proceedings with the need to
ensure that the essential elements of the dispute are known to the parties as well
as the arbitrator. If the issue was not in play during the proceedings, it may be
inferred that the 'tribunal had gone on a frolic of it (sic) own and put forth its
very own idea unsupported by the evidence placed before it'."
In Dongwoo Mann+Hummel Co Ltd v Mann+Hummel Gmbh," the claimant
argued that a breach of natural justice had occurred when the other party
sent documentation to the tribunal which it had not been allowed to review.
The claimant had argued that the initial design that had been supplied by the
defendant under their agreement was defective and it was the alleged defects of
this design that the tribunal had addressed. In the application to set aside the
award, the claimant argued that the tribunal should have considered whether the
52 [1985] EGLR 14, 15.
5 [1992] 2 NZLR 452.
[2006] 2 Lloyd's Rep 1.
Sobati General Trading LLC v PT Multistrada Arahsarana [20101 1 SLR 1065 at [22] per
Tay Yong Kwang J.
[2008] 3 SLR (R) 871.
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defendant should have been held liable for the delay in providing the improved
version of the initial design which the tribunal held had not been defective. This
was of course a completely different issue. The claimant argued that the failure to
examine this alternative theory of liability resulted in a breach of the principles
of natural justice. Predictably, the Singapore High Court gave short shrift to
this argument. Chan Seng Onn J observed that it was the responsibility of the
claimant to have advanced this theory of liability to the tribunal. The judge
thought that the claimant was effectively asking for a second bite of the cherry
'so that it could ventilate an alternative claim at a second arbitration, when such
an alternative claim was clearly foreseeable and should have been included for
determination at this arbitration in the first place'." The essential function of
the arbitrator, the judge observed, is to resolve claims and the live issues raised
and disputed by the parties and does not extend to those which the parties never
raised in the first place. Concluding that the tribunal did not rely on the material
that was not disclosed to the claimant to reach its decision, the judge concluded
that the causative link between the breach and resulting prejudice, even at a level
lower than 'substantial prejudice'," had not been established.
The decisions in Pacific Recreation Pre Ltd and SY Technology Inc and Koh
Bros Building59 and Civil Engineering Contractor Pte Ltd v Scotts Development
(Saraca) Pte Ltdo respectively established the principles that a breach of the
hearing rule would occur when the tribunal decides a case on a basis not raised
or contemplated by the parties and when a party is not allowed to address the
tribunal on a key issue. In such cases, the affected party could legitimately
complain that it was denied an opportunity to be heard or to address the
tribunal on its point of view of the law and the interpretation of facts upon
which the dispute was decided.
In 2011, the High Court of Singapore found that the hearing rule had been
breached by the arbitrator. This is the first reported case in which a party had
successfully persuaded a Singapore court to set aside an award on the ground
that principles of natural justice had been breached. In Front Row Investment
Holdings (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Daimler South East Asia Pte Ltd,62 Front Row
invoked s 48(1)(a)(vii) claiming that the arbitrator had breached the hearing rule
[2008]3 SLR (R) 911.
58 Soh Beng Tee & Co v Fairmount Development Pte Ltd [2007] 3 SLR(R) 86, 91.
' [2008] 2 SLR (R) 491.
60 [2002] 2 SLR (R) 1063.
A breach of the rules of natural justice has lead to an arbitrator being removed for
misconduct: see Koh Bros Building & Civil Engineering Contractor Pte Ltd v Scotts
Development (Saraca) Pe Ltd [2002] SGHC 223.
62 [2010] SGHC 80.
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when he focused on and dealt with only one misrepresentation alleged by Front
Row when in fact Front Row had alleged three misrepresentations. In other
words, two causes of action were effectively ignored by the arbitrator.
Andrew Ang J derived assistance from Australian authorities interpreting
construction legislation from the state of New South Wales." The Australian
cases had interpreted the provision circumscribing the matters that could be
considered by an adjudicator, and had held that the adjudicator's failure to
consider or address his mind to certain submissions and matters breached this
provision, and could also be considered a breach of the principles of natural
justice. The learned judge also relied on the observations of Judith Prakash J in
SEF Construction Pte Ltd v Skoy Connected Pte Ltd" on the persuasive value of
these Australian decisions in determining the content of the hearing rule. The
propositions of law regarding the hearing rule that Andrew Ang enunciated are
as follows:
* tribunals must consider all issues raised by the parties;
* natural justice principles are breached if the arbitrator disregards the
submissions made by a party during the hearing, or has regard to them but
does not really try to understand them and so fails to deal with the matter in
dispute;
* an arbitrator flours the hearing rule when he does not expressly deal with
arguments and explain why he was rejectinp them, even though the decision
implicitly or explicitly rejects the argument; and
* a reviewing court will look at the face of the documents and the tribunal's
decision to determine whether the tribunal has in fact fulfilled its duty to
apply its mind to the issues placed by the parties before it and considered the
arguments raised.
Front Row probably heralds an approach of the Singapore courts to discourage
seemingly casual approaches to submissions by the parties and perhaps is an
attempt to signal an intolerance with procedural unfairness. The Singapore
Court of Appeal in CRWJoint Operations v PTPerusahaa Gas Negara (Persero),"
after a detailed discussion of complex construction dispute arbitration
proceedings, set aside an award in a construction arbitration and reversed the
holding of the lower court that the owner had been given an opportunity to
6' Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Act 1999.
61 [2009] SGHC 257.
65 This rule adopted by Judith Prakash J was in the context of removing an arbitrator for
misconduct involving the breach of the hearing rule. However, there is no reason why
the same rule cannot support setting aside an award for the breach of the hearing rule.
6 [2011]4 SLR 305.
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present its case. The Court of Appeal disagreed with the finding of the lower
court that the owner had been given an opportunity to present its case. The
owner in the construction dispute had been asked by the tribunal to state what it
believed it owed the contractor when it, the owner, disputed the amount set by
the adjudicator. The majority of the arbitrators faulted the owner in the award
for not providing this information. The court regarded this direction to provide
information about the amount owing as 'an affront to the principle that each
party must have a reasonable opportunity to present its case'.6 ' The court noted
that the arbitral hearing 'had a rather limited compass68 and the owner had
not envisaged having to produce evidence on how much it owed the claimant-
contractor.
It would appear that the Singapore courts have developed a coherent body
of law with regard to the hearing rule that can provide guidance for arbitrators
conducting arbitration proceedings in Singapore. Hitherto, it was most
unusual for the highest court to cast strictures on the conduct of an arbitrator
in observing the principles of justice. The gentle reprimand delivered to an
arbitrator in this proceeding by Rajah JCA 69 may be a salutary shot across
the bow of arbitrators intending to show that the indulgence of the courts to
missteps in arbitration proceedings has definite limits.
C. The rule against bias
Of the two rules of natural justice, the rule against bias70 is arguably the rule
where, in the case of actual bias, even minor infractions should not be tolerated.
A violation against the hearing rule may be attributed to a procedural oversight,
but a rule against bias goes to the root of the integrity of the adjudication. As
William Park observes, '[i]ntegrity is to arbitration what location is to the price
of real estate. Without it, few other things matters very much, if at all'. Often,
parties choose arbitration in order to get a neutral forum and avoid a biased
nationalist judge. It would be ironical if they chose arbitration for this reason
and end up with a biased arbitrator. Rarely are frivolous allegations of actual bias
made72 as a serious charge that goes to the integrity of a judge or an arbitrator is
67 Ibid, [94].
68 Ibid.
69 Ibid, [93].
70 See Luttrell (note 41 above).
71 William Park, 'Foreword' in Luttrell (note 41 above).
72 But see Alpha Projektholding GMBH v Ukraine, where a charge of bias was made because
counsel for a party and the arbitrator nominated by that party had studied together in
the Harvard Law School graduate program during a particular year: ICSID Case No
ARB/07/16.
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perhaps unnecessary because of the safeguards of the system. Public confidence
that adjudicators are free of bias is important to any society. Critics have faulted
the US Supreme Court for declining to be bound by a publicly available code
of ethics on conflicts of interest although other federal courts are so bound. The
UK Supreme Court has found it desirable to publish ethics guidelines on its
website."
In international commercial arbitration proceedings, the frequency of
challenges based on bias has increased." Some writers have attributed this
phenomenon to the arrival of large numbers of common law trained arbitration
practitioners who relish adversarial tactics. It is to be expected that as Singapore
continues to become a popular arbitration hub, a similar development regarding
bias challenges will occur in Singapore. One reason for such challenges is the fact
that the pool of qualified specialized professionals is relatively small and such
professionals could sometimes act as counsel in arbitrations and sometimes as
arbitrators. In specialized areas such as foreign direct investment disputes before
the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, the problem
of 'repeat arbitrators' who are frequently apointed by claimants or host states
have given rise to challenges regarding bias. The International Bar Association
has published guidelines in the form of red, orange and green lists that could
be consulted in situations where bias could be alleged. In Locabail v Bayfield
Properties,n the court provided a set of examples where an allegation of apparent
bias would not be justified.
Rarely, is the charge of actual bias made in Singapore. In Anwar Siraj v Ting
Kang Cheng,n the court held that a subjective lack of confidence in the arbitrator
is insufficient. The test is objective and a reasonable person must think, on the
basis of real grounds, that the arbitrator could not or would not fairly determine
the issue on the basis of the evidence and the arguments to be made before him.
7 See: www.supremecourt.gov.uk.
7 See Kurkela and Snellman (note 47 above).
75 Margaret Moses, The Principles and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration
(Cambridge University Press, 2008), p 141.
7 For example, Tidewater Inc v Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela ICSID Case No ARB/1 0/5
(23 December 2010).
n Available at: www.ibanet.org. These guidelines include a non-exhaustive list of
circumstances pertaining to conflicts of interest in international arbitrations. Three
lists, red, orange, and green provide illustrations of different types of conflict of interest.
Circumstances described in the red list give rise to any real possibility of an objective
appearance of bias.
[2000 1 QB 141.
n (2003) 2 SLR (R) 287.
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English law has witnessed changing standards in respect of apparent bias.
The reasonable apprehension test was famously stated by Lord Hewart in Sussex
justices." The House of Lords in Gough" laid down a 'real danger' test so that
in order to show apparent bias, there must be a real danger of bias. However,
the House in Porter v Magilf2 abandoned the 'real danger of bias' test in favour
of the 'fair minded and informed observer' test. The question now asked in
English law is 'whether a fair-minded observer, having considered the facts,
would conclude that there was a real possibility that the tribunal was biased'.
In Australia, the International Arbitration Amendment Act (Cth)" raised the
threshold test for establishing arbitrator bias. The common law test that had
been used in Australia was the fair-minded objective person test. The amendment
provides that the identity of the arbitrator may be challenged only where there
are 'justifiable doubts' with respect to his impartiality or independence.
In ASM Shipping Ltd of India v TTMI Ltd of England,' the arbitrator in a
shipping dispute had previously acted as counsel in another arbitration in which
the firm of solicitors which had instructed him had made serious allegations
against one of the witnesses who had testified in the current arbitration. When
the owner objected to the arbitrator's involvement, he refused to step down
stating that no circumstances existed which gave rise to justifiable doubts about
his impartiality. The IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International
Arbitration" were brought to the attention of the court, but the judge did
not rely on these guidelines. Morrison J in deciding that the arbitrator must
resign applied a vague timeline standard. Disavowing an intent to establish
an 'Armageddon theory', he observed that the mere fact that an arbitrator
previously had a trade dispute with the parties or was a barrister, who was sitting
as the arbitrator, had once cross-examined an expert witness would not by
themselves be circumstances that cause an objectionable situation. However, in
both such situations, 'if the contact had been a short time before, and allegations
of dishonesty had been made, the position could be different'. With respect,
these seem to be rather tenuous criteria. In many arbitrations, expert witnesses
on trade practices or on foreign law are critical for the success of the case. If the
barrister had conducted an excoriating criticism of the expert witness bringing
80 R v Sussex Justices; exparte McCarthy [1924] 1 KB 256 ('Sussex Justices').
[1993] AC 646.
82 [2001] 1 All ER 465.
83 See: http://www.comlaw.gov.au/comlaw/management.ns/lookupindexpagesbyid/
IP200402434.
84 [20061 2 All ER (Comm) 122.
8 See IBA Guidelines (note 77 above).
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her competence into question but leaving her reputation for honesty intact, it
seems to be going too far to conclude that there is no bias. Such rules would lead
to a slippery slope where the arbitration community becomes a cosy club that
prizes mutual self-interest over the interest of the parties.
The test for apparent bias in Singapore appears to be a combination of the
reasonable apprehension test found in Sussex justices together with the 'fair-
minded and informed observer' test in Porter v Magill. Thus in Re Shankar
Alan slo Anant v Kulkarni,6 Sundaresh Menon JC stated that the complainant
must show that 'there are circumstances which would give rise to a reasonable
suspicion or apprehension in a fair-minded reasonable person with knowledge
of the relevant facts that the tribunal was biased'.8 ' Apparent bias could also be
shown by proof that the arbitrator had 'evinced a closed mind on the issue and
had entered into the fray'." Evidence of the arbitrator descending to the arena
of combat or taking an adversarial role will be evidence of apparent bias. These
criteria led Judith Prakash J in Kempinski Hotels SA v PT Prima International
Development" to hold that the arbitrator had not entered into the fray merely
because he was proactive and sought more information on issues that had been
raised by the defendant about the existence of a new management agreement
that the plaintiff was alleged to have made with a competitor of the defendant.
It is expected that allegations of apparent bias in the future will probably
involve allegations of having a closed mind or having entered into the fray.
Future arbitrators, mindful of the potential of these charges, will need to be
careful and display a willingness to hear arguments. They would also need to
draft a well-reasoned award that includes rational holdings on the facts and the
law. This would be a welcome outcome. With regard to entering the fray, this
allegation might have a chilling effect if arbitrators are dissuaded from taking a
more pro-active role in the arbitration and accelerate proceedings. This outcome
would be less welcome.
86 [2007] 1 SLR (R) 85.
87 Jbid, 9 1.
88 Turner (EastAsia) PRe Ltd v Builders Federal (Hong Kong) Ltd [ 1988] 1 SLR (R) 483.
" [2011] 4 SLR 633, [69].
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V. Conclusion
Hitherto, the principles of natural justice have principally been elucidated by
means of detailed rules as a result of self-regulation through arbitral institutions
and professional bodies. Critics of this process have argued that there is a
legitimacy deficit because it is an international treaty, ie the Convention,
that gives arbitration much of its force and importance. State parties to the
Convention, through their judicial branches, have an important role to play in
the development of standards contained in the Convention. Given this common
'ownership' of the Convention, courts rather than unelected and unaccountable
bodies, however eminent or distinguished, should be primarily responsible for
developing important criteria such as the principles of natural justice. Hence,
developments in the law relating to the role of natural justice in international
commercial arbitration may portend a discernible shift in arbitration culture
and put arbitrators on notice that supervisory courts will be alert to breaches of
natural justice principles by reference to judicially developed standards. As noted
earlier, high value arbitrations are increasingly being conducted in countries,
especially resource rich countries that do not have developed arbitration cultures.
This trend cannot be halted. Indeed, some studies project an increase of this
trend. Arbitration's major virtue is the avenue it provides to escape hometown
justice. But if arbitrators breach the hearing rule and the rule against bias, the
escape from hometown justice may prove to be illusory. In many countries in
Asia and Africa, arbitration should be encouraged but capacity building will
also be required. Coherent and clear statements by the courts of the arbitration
hubs will contribute to such capacity building as well as re-focus the attention
of arbitrators on a vital area of arbitration law that can sometimes be mistaken
for soft law. The arbitral jurisprudence of Singapore relating to natural justice
is a useful contribution to the consolidation and clarification of a body of law
fundamental to the integrity of arbitrations.
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